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Abstract: A field experiment provided cash incentives conditional on academic outcomes to eighth graders in public schools in the suburbs of Kathmandu, Nepal. Each student could earn a maximum of 500 
rupees (approximately 7 US dollars) every semester. Preliminary analysis shows that recipients have higher score than non-recipients in some subjects, the scores are similar in other subjects, and lower in yet other 
subjects.. Survey responses of students shows that that external rewards had no adverse effect students' intrinsic motivation to learn.
Introduction
In recent years, economists and educators have experimented with a number of 
innovations to increase school enrollment and improve academic outcomes of children. 
Conditional cash transfer programs, where parents receive cash reward conditional on 
their children’s school attendance, have shown to increase school attendance in 
developing countries. This study investigates if providing cash incentives to students 
conditional on grades improves the educational performance.
Methodology
A randomized field experiment was conducted in public schools in the suburbs of 
Kathmandu in Nepal. From a pool of 33 schools, 11 schools were randomly chosen to 
be in the treatment group while the remaining 22 schools constituted the control group. 
Grade 8 students in treatment schools received cash incentive for their performance in 
each of three semester exams held in the academic year 2009/10. The reward was 5 
rupees (~7 US cents) per point for students scoring more than the passing threshold of 
32 and 2.5 rupees (~3.5 US cents) for those scoring less than 32. Students could score a 
maximum of 100 points each semester. Grade 8 students were chosen for the study 
because they take a district level exam at the end of the year. This ensures that the 
endline test is the same for all students, even those from different schools. The total 
sample size is 1511 students with 390 students in the treatment group.
Table 1 shows that randomization was largely successful in splitting the sample into two 
similar groups.
Table 1: Sample Balance Across Treatment 
Arms










































equality of two 
groups 
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
School Level Variables
Total Enrollment* 363.6 178.0 11 421.9 262.2 21 0.51
Number of Teachers 19.5 6.4 11 22.7 7.7 21 0.25
Pupil Teacher Ratio 18.5 6.5 11 18.4 9.2 21 0.97
Infrastructure Index (0-
7)** 5.6 1.1 11 6 1.02 22 0.25
Number of Buildings 3.6 0.8 11 4.0 1.9 22 0.60
Number of Rooms 16.7 7.5 11 20.1 7.4 22 0.23
Baseline Scores***
Nepali 47.7 11.9 340 43.7 11.6 845 0.13
English 43.1 14.6 338 41.1 13.2 845 0.61
Math 38.2 15.6 337 38.4 15.4 845 0.94
Science 47.6 14.9 339 45.9 16.1 845 0.55
Social Studies 51.4 13.1 340 47.0 14.0 845 0.11
Proportion of students 
repeating grade 8
0.11 0.32 374 0.09 0.28 1036 0.76
Treatment Control
P-value for 
equality of two 
groups (unclustered
standard errors)
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Nepali 1.52 0.59 299 1.53 0.56 838 0.95
English 1.65 0.72 298 1.61 0.64 837 0.39
Math 1.63 0.76 298 1.61 0.74 837 0.57
Science 1.43 0.62 297 1.46 0.61 834 0.61
Social Studies 1.52 0.63 297 1.60 0.62 833 0.07*
Health and Physical Education 1.69 0.61 298 1.61 0.61 707 0.05**
Population and Environment 1.75 0.66 298 1.68 0.65 705 0.16
Moral Science 1.73 0.72 183 1.80 0.79 440 0.31
Vocational Studies 1.74 0.72 253 1.76 0.69 545 0.81
Table 2: Impact of Incentives (β2)on Academic 
Achievement
Econometric Specification
The impact of incentives on students’ achievement is estimated using the following 
equation . A random effect model is also fitted to take advantage of panel data. Scores 
are normalized with respect to the mean and standard deviation of scores in control 
schools. All reported standard errors are clustered at the school level to allow for 
correlation across observations within the same school.
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Findings
Table 2 shows that incentive recipients performed better than non recipients in some 
subjects (science, and health and physical education), about the same on other subjects 
(nepali, math, social studies, and population and environment), and worse in yet other 
subjects (english, moral science, and vocational studies), although clustered errors are 
large enough such that these estimates  are statistically insignificant. These results are 
largely consistent with the recent findings from a study by Roland Fryer (2010) in urban 
school districts in the US.
* significant at 10% level   **significant at 5% level   ***significant at 1% level
Effect on Intrinsic Motivation
Psychologists argue that providing external rewards to students could have adverse 
impact on their intrinsic motivation to learn. A survey conducted at the end of the year 
asked students how interested were they in learning each subject. The students had four 
options to choose from: highly interested (1), moderately interested (2), not very 
interested (3), not interested at all (4). Table 3 shows that there is no significant 
difference in students’ interest to learn in all but two subjects, and the impact run in 
different directions in the two subjects. These results show that incentives had little 
impact on intrinsic motivation of students.
Table 3: Impact of Incentives on Intrinsic       
Motivation
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Discussion and Future Direction
The observed data is likely consistent with the theory of multitasking moral hazard. In 
response to incentives, instead of increasing total effort, students reallocate effort towards 
subjects with the highest marginal rates of return to effort. Further study is necessary to 
test this hypothesis directly.
In contrast to both economists’ and psychologists’ claim of monotonic effect of incentives 
on performance, Gneezy and Rusticini (QJE 2000) find a non-monotonic relationship. 
Subjects who receive small financial compensation perform worse than those who do not, 
but those who receive a large amount do better than non-recipients. The study should  be 
extended by providing a range of compensation amount to see if the result holds in 
educational settings. 
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